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The International Legal Ethics Conference (ILEC3) was held at the Sheraton Mirage Hotel
on the Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia from 13 to 16 July 2008. This was the third ILEC.
The first was held at the University of Exeter, England, in 2004; and the second at the
University of Auckland, New Zealand, in 2006.1 A colloquium associated with this series was
also held at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2005. ILEC3 was
co-hosted by the Law Schools at Griffith University, Gold Coast, and The University of
Queensland, Brisbane. As two of the organisers, we were greatly encouraged by the continued
enthusiasm and support of those who had attended ILEC1 and ILEC2, and that the series is
growing in both the breadth and the depth of support it is receiving from legal ethics
scholars. ILEC3 attracted 165 delegates; 107 academics, professional regulators and practising
lawyers contributed papers. The international strength of the conference was reinforced by
the representation of contributors from Australia, Canada, England, Hong Kong, Japan,
Kenya, New Zealand, Scotland and the United States. Although the series has always featured
American speakers, delegates have tended to come from Commonwealth countries. A
particularly promising feature of ILEC3 was the large number of scholars from the United
States who attended and participated, some contributing two or three papers. Especially
given the prominence of American work in the field, this bodes well for positioning the
specialist ILEC series at the centre of legal ethics scholarship. It is a unique opportunity for
international scholarly exchange in the field.
The program for ILEC3 was divided between daily keynote presentations in plenary
sessions and streams run in parallel—three being held at any one time. There were separate
streams on ‘Lawyering; Business or Profession?’; ‘Rethinking Legal Ethics’; ‘Legal Ethics and
the Future’; ‘Models of Professional Regulation’; ‘Character and Virtue’; ‘Health and
Contemporary Legal Practice’; ‘Contemporary Legal Practice’; ‘Ethical Issues in Mediation’;
‘Empirical Studies of Lawyering’; ‘Ethics of Judicial Decision-Makers’; ‘Gender and the
2 Reid Mortensen and Linda Haller, ‘Legal Profession Reform in Queensland’ (2004) 23 University of Queensland
Law Journal 280, 283.
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Profession’; ‘Legal Education’; ‘Ethical Conduct in Fiction’; and ‘Ethical Decision-Making in
Practice’. A ‘Large Law Firms’ stream was particularly active, having four separate sessions
running through the conference.
The conference was opened with recognition of both its international representation
and local hospitality. Professor Kim Economides (Exeter), the initiator of ILEC and former
editor of Legal Ethics, introduced the conference as part of the ILEC series. A generous
welcome to the country was also given by Uncle Graham Dillon, an elder of the Kombumerri
and Ngarang-Wal people—the Aboriginal custodians of the Gold Coast region. This was
followed by dancing, music (didgeridoo and sticks) and a smoking ceremony—for which the
Sheraton took special care to turn smoke detectors off—by Noonuccal people from
Stradbroke Island.
The ILEC series is academic, scholarly and critical in its focus. In addition to an increased
depth of distinguished scholars, ILEC3 sought to enhance the scope of perspective and
expertise of previous conferences by actively incorporating the local practising profession
into the conference. The Monday program was therefore dedicated to academic, regulator
and practitioner contributions on legal practice, and was opened by the Honourable Kerry
Shine MP, Attorney General for Queensland, and the Honourable Paul de Jersey AC, Chief
Justice of Queensland. Seizing his opportunity with a roomful of legal academics before him,
the Chief Justice (whose contribution to raising both admission and disciplinary standards
has been significant)2 returned to a theme that he has notoriously pursued in lawyer
admission applications in Queensland—the signal that law student misconduct gives of
unsuitability for legal practice. The Honourable Ian Callinan AC QC, former Justice of the
High Court of Australia, ended the day on a very different note—that raising the ethical
responsibilities of advocates when they make decisions about the arguability of cases or
alleging judicial bias may be expecting more of them than their traditional role can
reasonably require. 
The plenary sessions on the Monday opened the conference theme of Integrity in Legal
Practice, and were designed to be of relevance to practising Australian lawyers. Professor
Gino Dal Pont (Tasmania) examined recent changes in Australia—specifically the State-by-
State implementation of the Model Laws on national legal practice that are intended to
harmonise the regulation of Australian legal professions. He suggested that, on the whole, the
Model Laws and the subordinate rules and regulations they bring with them should
encourage a clearer articulation of ethical practice in the legal profession. This was illustrated
by engagement with a broader academic discussion of ethics in Australia in a panel
discussion involving the Legal Services Commissioners of New South Wales (Mr Steve Mark),
Queensland (Mr John Briton) and Victoria (Ms Victoria Marles). The three commissioners,
who together are the key professional regulators for most Australian lawyers, have themselves
exemplified a high degree of mutual co-operation and assistance. In the panel discussion,
3 Richard Wasserstrom, ‘Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues’ (1975) 5 Human Rights 1, 3.
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they identified future challenges in the increasing diversity of legal practice and the
corporatisation of the profession.
The conference themes were introduced—and thoroughly analysed—by the other
keynote speaker, Professor David Luban (Georgetown). His paper ‘Tales of Terror: Lessons
for Lawyers from the “War on Terrorism”’ disputed the optimist view of role morality in the
‘craft of lawyering’ taken up later in the conference by Professor Brad Wendel (Cornell).
Luban pointed to the newly coined phrase ‘lawfare’ (the use of law as a weapon in global
militarism) as a natural product of the adversary impulse. Referring to Richard
Wasserstrom’s famous example of the overrepresentation of lawyers involved in the
Watergate scandal,3 Luban argued that it is unsurprising that so many US lawyers have been
involved in the Bush administration’s aggressive approach to foreign affairs. Luban cited the
example of the ‘torture memos’ penned by Office of Legal Counsel lawyer and Berkeley
Professor of Law, John Yoo. In those memos, Yoo took a series of illogical steps, under
jurisprudential language, to reinterpret the UN Torture Convention and allow physically
and psychologically intrusive methods of interrogation. Luban contended that it is the
lawyer’s counselling role that is of concern in this case. Without the check of the adversary
system, lawyers become ‘lawmakers’ of ‘secret law’ on which clients invariably act. Luban
contrasted the perverse outcomes of such aggressive partisanship to the very clearheaded
(and brave) decisions of the Judge Advocate-General (JAG) lawyers, defending detainees,
who were motivated by what they saw as a disruption of the rule of law. Luban therefore
appeared to pre-empt Wendel’s argument that fidelity to the law (and the adversarial process)
produced, in this case, ethical lawyering. 
A stunning parallel with Luban’s account of the concerns of JAG lawyers defending
Guantánamo Bay inmates was offered by another panel dedicated to the ethical issues for the
lawyers who had represented Australian terror suspect Dr Mohamed Haneef—who turned
out to be nothing more than a suspect. It also raised issues that challenge Dal Pont’s
argument that harmonised professional rules could bring greater clarity to ethical practice
in Australia and the consistent application of rules by regulators. The panel included
Haneef ’s Brisbane lawyers, Stephen Keim SC and Peter Russo. Keim illustrated the challenges
for the commissioners when he reflected on his actions for Haneef. In this cause célèbre, Keim
engaged the media (by releasing a transcript of police interviews) in defence of his client in
the face of what he saw as a perversion of proper prosecutorial process. He was personally
pursued by an embittered Australian Federal Police, which succeeded in establishing with the
Queensland regulators that by releasing the police interview Keim was in technical breach
of the Barristers Rule. However, Keim said he did not even turn his mind to the Barristers
Rule when he released the police interview. Nor did the regulators think the breach amounted
to substandard professional conduct. Like the JAG lawyers described by Luban, Keim
understood his role of fearless advocate for his client (in the face of threats of professional
discipline) as ‘an essential incident of the judicial process’ and argued strongly for
4 Simon articulated this thesis most famously in ‘Ethical Discretion in Lawyering’ (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review
1083; and The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics (Harvard University Press, 1998), 138–69.
5 While he conceded that ‘the concept of the rule of law has a lot of baggage associated with it’, Wendel argued
that ‘there is a core’ concept that the institution of the law only retains its validity (its ‘legality’) because it ‘em-
phasises constraint on the arbitrary exercise of power’. 
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professional regulation which permits such practices. And permit them is what the
Queensland regulators did. 
On the Tuesday, Professor Bradley Wendel (Cornell) continued his significant
contribution to the ILEC series. In his paper ‘Legal Advising and the Rule of Law’, Wendel
echoed Professor William Simon’s argument at ILEC2 that role morality should include
jurisprudential analysis. While Wendel criticised Simon’s version of fidelity to law as
requiring a search for the ‘fundamental values’,4 he similarly based his conception of ethical
lawyering on the ‘rule of law’.5 Wendel’s thesis, however, was that it is precisely because there
is no consensus as to ordinary morality, and in turn the justice or fairness of any one legal
outcome, that the rule of law gains its normative and ethical significance. Thus, Wendel
contended that ‘when lawyers are representing clients within a reasonably just political
system, their role partakes of the positive value of the rule of law’. However, he did not simply
articulate a standard conception argument that all such lawyers are ‘good people’. He argued
for a renewed interest in ‘the craft of lawyering’ which he defined as an instinctive
professional habit of (many) lawyers to distinguish between ‘legal alchemy’ (going beyond
the lawful authority as bounded by a client’s legal entitlement) and ‘fidelity to law’. While the
distinction is not always an easy one, he claimed that this approach delivers a more reliable
path for a lawyer to act ethically, as the law is well equipped to provide prescriptive rules
about interpretation of the law. He concluded by contending that a substantial task of legal
ethics is then to examine individual instances of lawyers engaging in an abuse of power (if
purportedly in the service of client demands), rather than theoretical challenges to role
morality.
In this thesis, Wendel diverged not only from the theories of Simon, but also significantly
from the views of another keynote speaker, Professor Deborah Rhode (Stanford). Rhode
responded to Wendel’s work in a rather different way to Luban. Her paper ‘Personal Integrity
and Professional Ethics’ also examined role morality. Yet Rhode emphasised the core claim
of the moral activist position that reference to an adversarial tradition does not answer, let
alone exhaust, morality. She cited examples in the corporate world that increasingly restrict
scope for ethical consideration and that demand complete devotion to the client’s project.
Thus, Rhode called for personal accountability for the consequences of professional action.
Her paper considered the multiple meanings of ‘integrity’, and how these ideas can and
should be applied to legal practice. She argued for a synthesis of the common and
philosophical notions of integrity that impel lawyers to reflect on their principles and
conduct their professional lives according to ‘consistent, disinterested and generalizable
principles’. While Rhode’s thesis appeared to converge with the conclusions of Luban and
Wendel, she contended that lawyers must take account of more than relevant laws. A lawyer
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must also weigh other, equally important, societal interests drawn from outside the legal
canon and professional tradition. She suggested that, far from doomsday predictions of an
oligarchy of lawyers, we can understand this as an ethical exercise when it is performed in
good faith. 
The keynote speakers, and dozens of papers in the conference streams, reminded
delegates that legal professions around the world carry models of poor—even bad—legal
practice; and—no surprise to readers of this journal—that legal ethicists offer a bewildering
array of responses to them. On the final day of the conference, the keynote speakers joined
in a roundtable discussion of such ‘hard cases’ and how (or whether) to educate lawyers for
ethical decision making. Moderated by Associate Professor Christine Parker (Melbourne),
the roundtable tested these ideas by debating three questions from three philosophical
stances. Luban claimed the role of the interrogating Socrates, despite noting that the latter
was famous for his ‘prodigious ugliness’. Rhode assumed the role of the ‘integrator’—the
‘philosophically informed and empirically ground ethicist’; and Wendel—‘the new
generation’—played Plato.
Luban’s first question was self-reflective: does legal ethics need philosophical
foundations? Answering his own question, Luban suggested that, if nothing more,
philosophical ideas ‘organise’ his teaching of legal ethics. Rhode agreed with his approach,
contending that such ‘tools’ allow students to think more systematically and deeply about
problems. In addition to ethical theory, Rhode explained the insights provided by disciplines
such as psychology and law and economics. In respect of interdisciplinary study, Wendel
finally found some common ground with the other panelists; he advocated the use of social
psychology as a useful tool for empirical scholarship. However, as regards teaching and
ethical theory, Wendel provided a distinctly alternative perspective. He quipped that ‘the
word utilitarianism has [never] been uttered in my classroom’. As a matter of pedagogy, he
contended that he considered it a duty to equip graduates with the ‘risk management’ skills
of knowing the law which could practically only be achieved by an exclusive focus on black
letter law. He cited in support the many discipline cases in his teaching textbook which
concerned practitioners whose failure was a lack of knowledge of the law, rather than
trespassing on ‘ordinary morality’. He further argued that the ‘rationality of law’ provided
something analogous to ethics. That is, the law is not morally empty; rather it carries
important evaluative concepts such as loyalty and the fiduciary nature of the lawyer–client
relationship.
Wendel sought to define and distinguish what we mean by ‘legal ethics’. Cognisant of
Rhode’s critique that he is ‘doing legal ethics without the ethics’, he contended that we can
teach distinct fields of professional regulation that practically serve practitioners and
philosophical approaches. Rhode continued to disagree, pointing out that this approach
omits ‘all the critical perspectives on the regulatory process and access to justice’. This
diversity of position then provided an appropriate segue for Luban to introduce the second
question: do differing underlying philosophical views yield different results in difficult cases?
The panel debated two real life scenarios to test this. 
6 Gerald Postema, ‘Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics’ (1980) 55 New York University Law Review 63.
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In the first scenario, Luban related a story about the difficult position faced by a senior
New York prosecutor when he was told to pursue a case he believed to be weak and possibly
unjust (leading to the conviction of innocent men). The prosecutor decided to ‘throw’ the
case. This example prompted a heated debate among those on the stage and in the audience.
Not surprisingly, Wendel’s views gave pre-eminence to the adversarial process (including
the proper and just functioning of the relevant prosecutorial bureaucracy) and differed from
the conclusions of Rhode and Luban; the latter contending that this case was a ‘no brainer’
in supporting the decision of the prosecutor. Rhode pointed out that the ‘system’, which may
be broadly legitimate, does not always lead to just results. Consequently, it is important to
think about what it means ‘to do justice in a second best world’. From the audience, Dr Tim
Dare (Auckland) countered that we must not demand too much of lawyer role morality. It
does not need to provide a full account of morality. Rather individuals may seek alternative
avenues for achieving justice, such as law reform. Wendel agreed with this proposition,
suggesting that Rhode’s demand for critical perspectives may require responses outside the
lawyer role.
The second scenario was introduced by Rhode as an early professional dilemma to which
she had never found a satisfactory answer. The case involved a legal aid client she had met
during a law school internship. The client confessed to a breach of welfare rules, disclosure
of which would have meant the loss of a pension and resulting hardship. When she sought
advice from her supervisor, Rhode was simply told that it was a ‘difficult case’ and was left
to decide herself on what course to take. Many years later, Rhode conceded that she had not
arrived at a correct answer except that in certain cases ‘selective ignorance’ is necessary.
Turning to Wendel’s assertion as to the morality of fidelity to the law, she inferred from this
case that the law neither exhausts morality nor provides an answer for the role of the lawyer. 
The final question asked for predictions of future directions for the field. Luban’s answer
was to provide a brief historical account of the field, from its philosophical flourishing in the
1970s in the work of Wasserstrom, Simon and Gerald Postema;6 to empirical work of a more
descriptive nature; and finally a ‘new flowering of interest in the philosophical side’. It seemed
appropriate that as the new generation, Wendel argued for a place for philosophical inquiry
and research employing interdisciplinary tools. This fitting end to the conference provided
both an insight into the diversity of views and approaches on show, and a taste of the exciting
future work in the field. Indeed, Rhode took the opportunity to call for suggestions about
the next ILEC and the importance of forging scholarly connections for collaborative work
around the world.
We look forward to fostering and maintaining these links within the ILEC series and
beyond. As organisers, we acknowledge the material support of the College of Law, the Bar
Association of Queensland, the Queensland Law Society, the Queensland Legal Services
Commissioner and the Queensland Department of Justice. In the meantime, we take a last
look back at ILEC3 to recognise the enormous efforts of our co-organisers, Associate
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Professor Michael Robertson, Mr Kieran Tranter and Dr Lillian Corbin of Griffith University,
and thank them for the vision, initiative and organisation they demonstrated in bringing
this conference together. 
